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Abstract. In the field of Business Process Management formal models for the control flow of business 
processes have been designed since more than 15 years. Which methods are best suited to verify the bulk of 
these models? 
The first step is to select a formal language which fixes the semantics of the models. We adopt the language 
of Boolean systems as reference language for Boolean process models. Boolean systems form a simple 
subclass of coloured Petri nets. Their characteristics are low tokens to model explicitly states with a 
subsequent skipping of activations and arbitrary logical rules of type AND, XOR, OR etc. to model the split 
and join of the control flow.  
We apply model checking as a verification method for the safeness and liveness of Boolean systems. Model 
checking of Boolean systems uses the elementary theory of propositional logic, no modal operators are 
needed. Our verification builds on a finite complete prefix of a certain T-system attached to the Boolean 
system. It splits the processes of the Boolean system into a finite set of base processes of bounded length. 
Their behaviour translates to formulas from propositional logic. Our verification task consists in checking the 
satisfiability of these formulas. 
In addition we have implemented our model checking algorithm as a java program. The time needed to verify 
a given Boolean system depends critically on the number of initial tokens. Because the algorithm has to solve 
certain SAT-problems, polynomial complexity cannot be expected. The paper closes with the model checking 
of some Boolean process models which have been designed as Event-driven Process Chains. 
Keywords: Base process, Boolean system, EPC, model checking, SAT-problem, verification. 
1 Introduction 
In the field of Business Process Management during the last two decades several languages have 
emerged which are recommended for the modelling and execution of business processes. 
Examples are the languages EPC, BPEL, BPMN, YAWL or several components of UML 
[KNS1992, AND2003, OMG2009, AH2005, BRJ2005]. While some of these languages like EPCs 
(Event-driven Process Chains) or UML (Unified Modeling Language) are often used in 
commercial projects, others stay mainly in the academic domain. 
With the term Boolean process model we denote a model of the control flow of a process, which 
employs rules of propositional logic to describe the branching of the control flow. A simple 
example is an alternative specified by an XOR-rule or an OR-rule. All languages mentioned above 
have constructs to model the activities of a process. The languages support the necessary process 
primitives sequence, iteration, alternative and parallelism. Some languages can even more, they 
are able to model distributed process states. These languages are used therefore to design Boolean 
process models. 
The languages enjoy different degrees of formalization. In general their syntax is well-defined but 
often the semantics is ambiguous or lacks completeness. Therefore several authors have 
undertaken the effort to translate these languages to a reference language with a well-defined 
semantics. In most cases Petri nets or transitions systems are used as reference language. 
Petri nets have been invented at around 1960. They had a formal semantics right from the 
beginning. The language of Petri nets does not only support the design of a static process model. 
Due to their token concept Petri nets are capable to simulate also the temporal development of a 
process, its runs. The language has enough expressive power to serve as a reference language for 
EPCs, BPEL, BPMN and the process languages of UML. The language YAWL (Yet Another 
Workflow Language), based on Petri nets too, extends ordinary Petri nets by constructs to deal 
with process patterns involving multiple instances, advanced synchronisation patterns, and 
cancellation patterns, see sect. 4.3 in [AH2005]. 
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Apparently, the correct definition of the control flow is a necessary requirement for the subsequent 
execution of the model, e.g. by a workflow engine. And before extending the model by input or 
output data or even by the data flow, the correctness of the control flow has to be established. This 
paper does not deal with the data flow, it focuses on the control flow. 
As soon as a process modelling language has got a well-defined semantics one can ask which 
formal methods are suitable to verify process models in this language. Petri net theory allows to 
verify models from certain subclasses of Petri nets in an efficient way. A paradigm is the mature 
theory of free-choice systems [DE1995]. 
Considered from a theoretical point of view, each ordinary Petri net can be verified by methods of 
Girard‘s linear logic. Linear logic represents in a direct way the firing rule of Petri nets: Entailment 
in linear logic has a “resource consuming character”. Each derivation of a given formula consumes 
the binding of the variables of the premise and allocates a binding of the conclusion. This is in 
contrast to propositional logic where a logical derivation does not remove the binding from the 
variables of its premise. But the general purpose character of linear logic is also a handicap when 
the method is applied to Petri nets arising from commercial applications. We do not know of a tool 
which verifies such Petri nets with the reduction rules of linear logic in an efficient way. 
Different methods have been developed for the verification of Boolean process models: 
A large verification project has been directed by van der Aalst and his co-workers [DVV2006]. 
The authors checked about 10.000 EPCs from the reference model of the system SAP R/3, 
Version 4.6. Each EPC model was pre-processed by a reduction method. The reduced EPC was 
then transformed into a workflow net, a certain type of ordinary Petri net. These workflow nets 
were automatically checked by tools from the ProM framework for the behavioural properties 
soundness and relaxed soundness. In a related paper [MMN2006] the authors inform the reader 
that at least 5.6% of the 10.000 EPCs under consideration are faulty. Interestingly, the authors 
from [DVV2006] created a separate EPC to formalize their verification process of EPCs. We will 
take a test of this EPC in Chapter 5. 
In a later paper [MA2008] the authors present additional reduction rules for EPCs. They claim: 
EPCs, which according to these rules can be reduced to EPCs with only XOR-connectors, are 
sound. The reduction is supported by a tool named xoEPC. The remaining irreducible EPCs have 
to be checked manually. The authors emphasize the necessity to discuss the intermediate EPCs 
with the modeller of the EPC during the reduction process, in order to ensure the intended 
semantics of the process model. We will take a test of the running example from [MA2008] in 
Chapter 5. 
The authors of [FFJ2009] investigated more than 700 business models from industrial 
applications. They checked them for safeness and absence of deadlock. The process models were 
designed in a proprietary language combining UML activity diagrams with BPMN. The authors 
compare three different methods of verification: The first two methods translate the process 
models from the proprietary language to ordinary Petri nets. The first method then applies model 
checking on the base of Computation Tree Logic (CTL), while the second translates the ordinary 
Petri net to a workflow net, then applies structural reduction rules and eventually explores the state 
space. The third method translates the original process model to a workflow graph, which is then 
decomposed into fragments with only a single entry and a single exit (SESE decomposition). 
Eventually the method ends with a combination of heuristics and state space exploration. Each of 
the three methods is supported by a different tool: LoLA, Woflan and IBM Websphere Business 
Modeler. The authors present detailed reports about the number of detected faults and the 
performance of their methods. 
In an earlier paper [LSW1998] we have introduced Boolean systems as a subclass of coloured Petri 
nets. We have demonstrated how Boolean systems can be used as a reference language for EPCs.  
The present paper continues the study of Boolean systems. It shows how to verify Boolean 
systems. The verification will determine whether the Boolean system is well-behaved, i.e., safe 
and live. And by the verification of the Boolean system also the EPC is verified. 
Liveness assures that a given action can be executed again and again from every reachable state of 
the process. Safeness assures that each local state of the system is determined by a well-defined 
token. In our opinion liveness and safeness are the two minimal requirements for a correct Boolean 
process model. They presuppose the Boolean system to be strongly connected. 
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Safeness of a Boolean system follows easily from the safeness of its skeleton. The skeleton is 
obtained by forgetting all colours of the Boolean system. A strongly connected skeleton is a 
T-system. The verification of T-systems is a well-established task. Much more difficult is the 
question of liveness of a Boolean system. High-performance algorithms to check liveness of a 
problem have to circumvent the state explosion problem. The number of reachable states increases 
exponentially with the size of the system. Strongly connected Boolean systems arise from 
T-systems by adding Boolean expressions as guard formulas to specify the different firing modes 
of the transitions. To check liveness of a safe Boolean system we proceed as follows: 
First we translate the behaviour of the Boolean system to formulas from propositional logic. Then 
we check the satisfiability of these formulas. What is closer related than these two procedures? 
Our approach is an example of model checking. This method follows the principle to formalize 
“system enjoys property” as “system’s semantics is model of formula” [Esp1994]. In general the 
formulas in question have to be taken from modal logic. However, to analyze liveness of Boolean 
systems it is sufficient to employ propositional logic only, which is an elementary theory. No use 
of any modal operator is necessary. 
Model checking of a safe, strongly connected Boolean system starts with applying prefix theory to 
the skeleton. One obtains a finite complete prefix of its unfolding. By adding colours the prefix 
extends to a Boolean net. One has to consider a finite set of base markings on it and to check 
deadlock freeness and liveness for each of the resulting base processes. 
We have implemented our model checking algorithm by a java program and tested its performance 
on a standard notebook with 2.53 GHz. Our implementation of the model checking algorithm 
shows a performance of some seconds per model with about 25 Boolean transitions and 30 places. 
Of course this result is not yet comparable to the time range of milliseconds reported in [FFJ2009]. 
At this stage the performance bottleneck is our simple SAT-solver written on the basis of the 
resolvent algorithm. Of course the SAT-problem is NP-complete, nevertheless the first step to 
enhance the performance of our model checking implementation would be to link one of the SAT-
solvers from the SAT research community. 
Figure 1 shows the running example of the present paper. 
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Figure 1: EPC Loan request 
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The EPC of the process “Loan request” has been taken from Fig. 1 in [MA2008] and slightly 
adapted. In a similar form it has been considered before in Abb. 4.31 from [Rum1999]. The 
process is described in [MA2008] as follows: 
“The start event loan is requested signals the start of the process and the precondition to execute 
the record loan request function. After the post-condition request is recorded, the process 
continues with the function conduct risk assessment after the XOR-join connector. The subsequent 
XOR-split connector indicates a decision. In case of a negative risk assessment, the function check 
client assessment is performed. The following second XOR-split marks another decision: in case 
of a negative client assessment the process ends with a rejection of the loan request; in case of a 
positive client assessment, the conduct risk assessment function is executed a second time under 
consideration of the positive client assessment. If the risk assessment is not negative, there is 
another decision point to distinguish new clients and existing clients. In case of an existing client, 
the set up loan contract function is conducted. After that, the AND-split indicates that two 
activities have to be executed: first, the sign loan contract function; and second, the offer further 
products subsequent process [...]. If the client is new, the analyze requirements function has to be 
performed in addition to setting up the loan contract. The OR-join waits for both functions to be 
completed if necessary. If the analyze requirements function will not be executed in the process, it 
continues with the subprocess immediately [...].“ 
While the process starts with a unique event “Loan is requested” it ends with one or more of the 
three events “loan request is rejected” (E1), ”loan contract is completed” (E2) and “client got 
further offer” (E3). E.g., not both events E1 and E2 can happen. The modeller intended either E1 
or the combination of E2 and E3 as possible final events. The process comprises a loop which is 
executed whenever the client is assessed positively but his requested loan is considered too risky. 
Note the subtle logic of the connectors after the function “conduct risk assessment: Either the 
event “negative risk assessment” happens or the event “positive risk assessment”. In the latter 
case, the event “requester is new client” may occur in addition. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recalls some fundamental concepts from 
the theory of ordinary Petri nets, in particular their prefix theory. Section 3 introduces the class of 
Boolean systems, a subclass of coloured Petri nets. We will use Boolean systems as a reference 
language for Boolean process models in general and EPCs in particular. Section 4 introduces the 
colouring of prefixes and the base processes of a safe Boolean system. We present a model 
checking algorithm as the main result of our paper. We apply the results in section 5 to the 
verification of EPCs. The paper continues in section 6 with comparing our method to the methods 
above proposed for the verification of EPCs. The paper ends with an outlook to future research. 
We assume that the reader is familiar with the theory of ordinary Petri nets. 
2 Ordinary Petri nets and their processes 
For the convenience of the reader and to fix the notation we recall some fundamental concepts 
from the theory of ordinary Petri nets, see also [DE1995]. 
A finite ordinary Petri net is a pair ( )µ,N : The net ( )FTPN ,,=  comprises a finite set P  of 
places, a disjoint finite set T  of transitions and a set ( ) ( )PTTPF ×∪×⊆  of directed arcs. The 
function N→P:µ  is named the initial marking of the net. The support of the marking µ  is 
the set 
( ) ( ){ }0:: >∈= pPpsupp µµ  
of all places marked at µ . We will often dispense with an explicit notation for the set of places 
and transitions of a net and use the shorthand Nx ∈  to denote a node TPx ∪∈ . For a 
node Nx ∈  we denote respectively by 
( ) ( ){ }FxyNyxxpre ∈∈== • ,::  and ( ) ( ){ }FyxNyxxpost ∈∈== • ,::  
the pre-set and post-set of x . For a subset NX ⊂  we set 
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( ) ( )U
Xx
xpreXpre
∈
=:  and ( ) ( )U
Xx
xpostXpost
∈
=: . 
All nets ( )FTPN ,,=  will be assumed connected, i.e. every two nodes Nyx ∈,  
satisfy ( ) ( ) ∗−∪∈ 1, FFyx . Within the net N  a path from a node Nxini ∈  to a node Nx fin ∈  is a 
sequence ( )nxxx ,...,, 10  with nodes Nxi ∈ , finnini xxxx == ,0  and ( ) Fxx ii ∈+1, . The path is 
named elementary path, if ji xx ≠  for all pairs ji ≠ . A circuit is a path ( )nxxx ,...,, 10  with 
0xxn = , it is named elementary circuit if the path ( )110 ,...,, −nxxx  is elementary. The net N  is 
strongly connected if for every two nodes Nxx ∈21,  a path from 1x  to 2x  and a path from 2x  
to 1x  exists. 
For a net N  the firing rule defines the firing of a transition: A transition Tt ∈  is enabled at a 
marking µ  of N  iff each place from its pre-set ( )tpre  is marked at µ  with at least one token. 
Being enabled, t  may occur or fire. Firing t  yields a new marking 'µ , which results from µ  by 
consuming one token from each pre-place of t  and by producing one token on each post-place 
of t ; this is denoted by 'µµ →t . 
A finite occurrence sequence from µ  is a sequence ktt ...1=σ , N∈k , such that 
k
t
k
t k µµµµ →→
−11 ...,,
1
. 
We denote by kµµ σ→  the fact, that firing σ  at the marking µ  yields the marking kµ . If  
...
321
21 →→→
ttt µµµ  
for an infinite sequence ...321 ttt ⋅⋅=σ then σ  is named an infinite occurrence sequence from µ . 
A reachable marking of a Petri net ( )µ,N  is a marking, which results from firing a finite 
occurrence sequence from µ . If not stated the contrary, occurrence sequences in this paper will be 
considered to be finite. The transitions from an occurrence sequence ktt ...1=σ  are not necessary 
pair wise different. The concatenation of two occurrence sequences 1σ  and 2σ  is denoted 
by 21 σσ ⋅ . 
A Petri net ( )0, µN  is live iff for each reachable marking µ  and for each transition Tt ∈  the Petri 
net ( )µ,N  has a reachable marking which enables t . A Petri net is bounded iff there exists a 
natural number which bounds from above the token content of every place at every reachable 
marking. If the bound can be chosen equal to 1 , then the Petri net is named safe. 
A simple class of ordinary Petri nets are marked synchronization graphs or T-systems. They are 
important for the present investigation because T-systems will be the skeletons of strongly 
connected Boolean systems introduced in Chapter 3. 
2.1 Definition (T-system) 
A net N  is a T-net if all places have exactly one pre-transition and exactly one post-transition, i.e. 
( ) ( )ppostppre == 1  for all places Np ∈ . 
A T-system is a Petri net ( )µ,N  with N  a T-net. 
 
If the firing of a finite occurrence sequence 21 µµ σ→  in a Petri net ( )0, µN  reproduces the 
original marking, i.e. if 12 µµ = , then the multiset 
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( ) ∑
∈
=
σ
σ
t
tParikh :  
formed by all transitions from σ  is a T-invariant. Each T-invariant of a connected 
T-net ( )FTPN ,,=  is a multiple of 
∑
∈
=
Tt
N t:τ , 
the multiset of all transitions from T , see Prop. 2.37 and Prop. 3.16 in [De1995]. 
A live T-system ( )0, µN  is cyclic, i.e. for each reachable marking µ  of ( )0, µN  the initial 
marking 0µ  is reachable in ( )µ,N . This result follows at once from Theor. 3.21 in [DE1995]. 
 
A useful means to control all reachable states of a Petri net is the concept of its unfolding and the 
corresponding prefix theory. For the convenience of the reader we recall now some relevant 
definitions and properties; see also [Esp1994, EH2008]. 
Let ( )FTP ,,  be a net and let TPxx ∪∈21, . The nodes 1x  and 2x  are in conflict, denoted 
by 21# xx , if distinct transitions Ttt ∈21,  exist with ( ) ( ) ∅≠∩ 21 tpretpre  and ( ) ( )2211 ,,, xtxt  
belonging to the reflexive and transitive closure of F . For TPx ∪∈ , x  is in self-conflict 
if xx# . 
An occurrence net is a net ( )KEBON ,,=  such that 
( ) 1≤bpre  for all Bb ∈ , 
the (irreflexive) closure of K  is acyclic, no element Ex ∈  is in self-conflict and ON  is well-
founded, i.e. for every EBx ∪∈ , the set of elements EBy ∪∈  such that ( )xy,  belongs to the 
transitive closure of K  is finite. Elements of E  are called events (German: Ereignis), elements 
of B  conditions (German: Bedingung) and K  is named the causal dependency relation (German: 
Kausalitätsbeziehung). If in addition also 
( ) 1≤bpost  for all Bb ∈  
then the occurrence net is called a causal net. 
Because ON  is acyclic the relation K  is a partial order on EB ∪ , which we denote by p . Its 
reflexive and transitive closure is denoted by 
=
p . Due to the well-foundedness of ON  the 
set ( )ONmin  of minimal elements with respect to p  is non-empty for non-empty ON . A set 'B  
of conditions of ON is a co-set if 
( ) ( ) ( )'#'':'', bbnotandbbnotandbbnotBbballfor pp∈ . 
A maximal co-set 'B  with respect to set inclusion is called a cut of ON . 
 
Causal and occurrence nets are the technical means to abstract from the concept of an occurrence 
sequence with a well-determined order of firing its transitions to the concept of a process, which 
does no longer distinguish between occurrence sequences differing only by the interleaving of 
their transitions. A further step is the introduction of branching processes which represent in 
compact form a set of alternative processes. And the final step is to prove the existence of a unique 
maximal branching process which is named the unfolding of the original Petri net. 
2.2 Definition (Processes and branching processes) 
Consider a Petri net ( )µ,N  with ( )FTPN ,,= . 
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i) A branching process ( )prON ,  of ( )µ,N  is a discrete morphism 
NONpr →:  
with ( )KEBON ,,=  an occurrence net and such that ( )ONmin  corresponds to the initial marking 
µ , i.e. 
( ) ( ) ( )ONpprp min1 ∩= −µ  for all places Pp ∈ . 
A transition Tt ∈  occurs in the process pr  iff ( )Tprt ∈ . A process  ( )prON ,  net is a branching 
process if ON  is a causal net. 
ii) On the set of all branching processes of ( )µ,N  the inclusion of nets defines a partial order: 
( ) ( ) 211211 ::: ONONNONprNONpr ⊆⇔→⊆→  and 121 | ONprpr = . 
In this case 1pr  is named a prefix of 2pr . A maximal branching process of ( )µ,N  is named an 
unfolding of ( )µ,N . 
 
A branching process NONpr →:  of ( )µ,N  maps each event of ON onto a transition of N  
and each condition of ON  onto a place of N . In this sense an event ONe ∈  represent the firing 
of the transition ( ) Nepr ∈  and a condition ONb ∈  represents a token on place ( ) Nbpr ∈ . Each 
cut 'B  of ON  corresponds to the reachable marking ( )'Bmark  of ( )µ,N , which marks each place 
of Np ∈  with ( ) '1 Bppr ∩−  tokens. 
Each safe Petri net has an unfolding which is uniquely determined up to isomorphism [Eng1991]. 
In general the unfolding is an infinite net. But the unfolding of a safe Petri net always has finite 
complete prefixes [McM1995]. They serve as a substitute for the unfolding, because they represent 
each reachable marking and the firing of each transition, which can occur in the original Petri net. 
2.3 Definition (Complete prefix) 
Consider the unfolding NUnfpr →:  of a Petri net ( )0, µN . A prefix 
UnfONNONpr ⊆→ ,| , 
is complete iff 
• for every reachable marking µ  of ( )0, µN  a cut c  of ON  exists with 
( ) ( ) cpprp ∩= −1µ  for all places Np ∈  
• and for every transition t of N , which can occur in ( )0, µN , an event e  of ON  exists 
with ( )eprt = . 
 
It is the first condition in Definition 2.3, which will be relevant for the model checking algorithm 
in Chapter 4. The first condition assures that each reachable marking of the Petri net is already 
reachable by a subprocess of a complete prefix. 
 
2.4 Example (Finite complete prefix) 
Figure 2 shows a finite complete prefix NONpr →:  of a live and safe T-system ( )0,µN  
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Figure 2: Finite complete prefix of a live and safe T-system (right) 
The process is visualised as follows: Nodes of ON  at the left hand side as well as nodes 
of ( )0,µN  at the right hand side are annotated with letters inside the node. In addition each 
node ONx ∈  is annotated outside the node with the name of the corresponding node ( ) Nxpr ∈ . 
Each of the two cuts of ON  
{ }21,min ccON =  and { }1413 ,max ccON =  
represents the initial marking  
( ) ( )ONmarkONmark maxmin0 ==µ . 
3 Boolean Systems 
In the following we denote by BOOLE  the set of all formulas from propositional logic over a 
fixed alphabet. In particular, these formulas contain the logical connectors AND ( ∧ ), XOR (
•
∨ ), 
OR ( ∨ ) and NOT ( ¬ ). We denote by 
{ }falsetrueBoole ,=  
the two-element set of truth values. We will often use high or the cipher 1 as a synonym for true 
and low or the cipher 0 as a synonym for false. 
A Boolean net arises from an ordinary net with unbranched places by adding 
• to each transition of the ordinary net a Boolean formula as guard formula which specifies 
different firing modes of the transition 
• and to each place of the ordinary net a second colour of low tokens. 
Boolean systems are a simple class of coloured Petri nets. For the purpose of the present paper we 
do not need to enter into the general theory. 
3.1 Definition (Structure of a Boolean System and skeleton) 
i) A Boolean net is a tuple ( )GXNBN ,,=  comprising: 
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• An ordinary net ( )FTPN ,,=  with unbranched places, i.e. 
( ) ( ) 11 ≤≤ ppostandppre  for all places Pp ∈ , 
• a place annotation, which annotates each place Pp ∈  with the set Boole , 
• an arc annotation ( )BOOLEVarFX →: , which maps each arc Fa ∈  to a Boolean 
variable ( ) ( )BOOLEVaraX ∈   
• and a transition annotation BOOLETG →: , which maps each transition Tt ∈  to a 
formula ( )mntt YYXXGG ,...,,,..., 11= , its guard formula. The variables 
{ } ( ) ( ){ }FtpandPptpXXX n ∈∈= ,:,,...,1  annotate the incoming arcs of t  and the 
variables { } ( ) ( ){ }FptandPpptXYY m ∈∈= ,:,,...,1  annotate the outgoing arcs of t . The 
pair ( )tGt,  is named a Boolean transition, the guard formula determines the logical type of 
the transition. 
ii) A marking µ  of BN  is a map 
NBooleP →:µ  
which maps each place Pp ∈  to a multi-set ( ) NBoolep ∈µ  over the set Boole . Therefore a 
place Pp ∈  has at µ  the token content 
( ) NBoolelownhighnp ∈⋅+⋅= 21µ  
with non-negative integers N∈1n , the number of high tokens, and N∈2n , the number of low 
tokens. The set of places with non-zero token content 
( ) ( ){ }0:: ≠∈= pPpsupp µµ  
is named the support of µ . 
iii) A Boolean system is a pair ( )µ,BNBS =  with a Boolean net BN  and a marking µ  of BN  
with at least one high token. 
iv) The skeleton skelBS  of a Boolean system ( )µ,BNBS =  with Boolean net ( )GXNBN ,,=  
and ordinary net ( )FTPN ,,=  is the ordinary Petri net ( )skelskelskel BNBS µ,=  with NBN skel =:  
and with marking 
( ) 21:: nnpP skelskel +=→ µµ N,  for Pp ∈  with ( ) NBoolelownhighnp ∈⋅+⋅= 21µ . 
Forgetting all colours induces a canonical morphism of Petri nets skelBSBSskel →: . 
 
In case a place has both an outgoing and an ingoing arc, we will always annotate both arcs with the 
same variable. In case a place has exactly one ingoing and exactly one outgoing arc, the arc 
annotation will be positioned in figures inside the place. 
A transition BNt ∈  with a unique pre-place and a unique post-place is named an unary transition. 
Besides its low binding an unary transition has a unique high binding. Transitions with either two 
pre-places and a unique post-place or with a unique pre-place and two post-places are named 
respectively closing or opening binary transitions. Without loss of generality we will often restrict 
to Boolean systems with only binary and unary transitions. For the purpose of verification we can 
even skip the unary transitions. 
Definition 3.1 requires that the initial marking of a Boolean system BS  comprises at least one 
high token. Otherwise no action would take place in the process represented by BS . 
Note. Readers interested in the formal definition of a Petri net morphism are referred to 
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[Weh2006]. 
3.2 Example (Boolean system) 
i) Figure 3 shows the scheme of a binary Boolean transition and explains its guard formula and the 
resulting binding elements. 
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Figure 3: Binary Boolean transitions with pre- and post-places and arc-annotations 
 
The column “Bindings” in Table 1 looks ahead to Definition 3.3. 
 
Logical type Guard formula Bindings for ( )ZYX ,,  
AND ( ) ( )[ ]ZYXZYX ∨∨¬∨∧∧  ( ) ( )0,0,0,1,1,1  
XOR ( )[ ]ZYXZYX ∨∨¬∨





∧





∨
•
 
( ) ( ) ( )0,0,0,1,1,0,1,0,1  
AND_XOR ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )[ ]ZYXZYXYX ∨∨¬∨∧¬∧∨∧  ( ) ( ) ( )0,0,0,1,0,1,1,1,1  
XOR_AND ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )[ ]ZYXZYXYX ∨∨¬∨∧∧¬∨∧  ( ) ( ) ( )0,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,1  
OR ( )[ ] ( )[ ]ZYXZYX ∨∨¬∨∧∨  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,1  
Table 1: Guard formulas and bindings of binary Boolean transitions 
Each guard formula is valid for both the opening and the closing Boolean transition of the given 
logical type. 
ii) Figure 4 shows a Boolean system ( )µ,BNBS = . The initial marking µ  marks the place 1A  
with one high token and the place 2A  with one low token. 
The Boolean system contains an XOR-loop, a loop which is entered by an opening XOR-transition 
and left by a closing XOR-transition. Boolean systems also allow loops with different logical 
transitions like OR or AND. Note that each elementary circuit in the Boolean system from Figure 
4 is marked with a single token. 
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Figure 4: Boolean system 
 
Different from a transition in ordinary Petri net a Boolean transition may have different firing 
modes. Each firing mode is named a binding element. 
3.3 Definition (Binding elements of a Boolean net) 
Consider a Boolean net ( )GXNBN ,,=  and a Boolean transition ( )tGt,  of BN . 
i) Each binding of the variables mn YYXX ,...,,,..., 11 , which tG  evaluates to true, is named a 
binding of the transition t  and the pair ( )bt,  is named a binding element. The binding with all 
variables bound to false is named the low binding, all other bindings are named high bindings. The 
corresponding binding elements are named respectively high binding element and low binding 
element. The set of all bindings of t  is denoted by ( )tB . We require that ( )tB  contains the low 
binding. 
ii) We require that ( )tGt,  is 
• faithful with respect to activation: No high binding ( ) ( )tByyxx mn ∈,...,,,..., 11  exists with  
( ) ( ) nn Boolexx ∈= 0,...,0,...,1  or ( ) ( ) mm Booleyy ∈= 0,...,0,...,1 , 
• and fair: For each pair ( ) mjniji ,...,1,,...,1,, == , a high binding ( ) ( )tByyxx mn ∈,...,,,..., 11  
exists with 1== ji yx . 
 
It depends on the token colours on the pre-places of the transition whether a certain binding 
element is enabled at a certain marking. Each binding element ( )bt,  of BN  has a well-defined 
enabling marking: The marking µ  of BN  with ( ) ( )tpresupp =µ , which enables ( )bt,  and marks 
each place from ( )tpre  with exactly one token. 
3.4 Definition (Firing rule of a Boolean system) 
Consider a Boolean system ( )µ,BNBS =  and a transition BNt ∈  with altogether N∈k  pre- 
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and post-places. A binding element 
( )bt, , ( ) ( ) kk BooletBxxb ⊂∈= ,...,1  
is enabled at µ , iff for each pre-place ( )tprep ∈  with arc annotation ( ) iXtpX =,  for an 
index { }ki ,...,1∈  the token content 
( ) NBoolelownhighnp ∈⋅+⋅= 21µ  
has coefficients respectively 
11 ≥n  if 1=ix  and 12 ≥n  if 0=ix . 
An enabled binding element ( )bt,  may occur. Its occurrence or firing yields a new marking 1µ : It 
results from µ by consuming a high token from each pre-place ( )tprep ∈  with 1=ix  and a low 
token from each pre-place with 0=ix , and by producing at each post-place ( )tpostp ∈  with arc 
annotation ( ) jXptX =,  for an index { }kj ,...,1∈  a high-token if 1=jx  and a low-token 
if 0=jx . This is denoted by 
( )
1
, µµ → bt . 
 
By definition, each transition BNt ∈  has a well-defined low binding ( )tBblow ∈ : Firing ( )lowbt,  
consumes a low token from each pre-place of t  and creates a low token at each post-place of t . 
Firing the low binding is interpreted as skipping the action represented by the transition. Because 
the initial marking 0µ  of a Boolean system ( )0, µBNBS =  contains at least one high token and 
because BN  is faithful with respect to activation, each reachable marking µ  of BS  also contains 
at least one high token. 
The concept of occurrence sequences which has been introduced for ordinary Petri nets in 
Section 2 generalizes to a Boolean system ( )0, µBNBS = : A finite occurrence sequence 
from 0µ  is a sequence ( ) ( )kk btbt ,..., 11=σ , N∈k , of binding elements such that 
( ) ( )
k
bt
k
bt kk µµµµ  → →
−
,
11
,
0 ...,,
11
. 
We denote by kµµ σ→0  the fact that firing σ  yields the marking kµ . If  
( ) ( ) ( )
...
332211 ,
2
,
1
,
0  → → →
btbtbt µµµ  
for an infinite sequence ( ) ( ) ( ) ...,,, 332211 btbtbt ⋅⋅=σ  then σ  is named an infinite occurrence 
sequence from 0µ . A reachable marking of BS  is a marking which results from firing a finite 
occurrence sequence from 0µ . The Boolean system BS  is safe iff every reachable marking 
of BS  marks each place of BN  with at most one token. 
 
3.5 Definition (Live, dead, synchronization deadlock) 
Consider a Boolean system ( )µ,BNBS = . 
i) A binding element of BS  is live iff for every reachable marking 1µ  of BS  the Boolean 
system ( )1, µBN  has a reachable marking which enables the given binding element. BS  is live 
with respect to all its high bindings iff every high binding element of BN  is live. 
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ii) A transition of BSt ∈  is high-live iff for every reachable marking 1µ  of BS  the Boolean 
system ( )1, µBN  has a reachable marking, which enables at least one high binding 
element ( ) ( )tBbbt ∈,, . BS  is high-live iff each transition is high-live. 
iii) A transition BSt ∈  is dead iff no reachable marking of BS  enables any binding 
element ( ) ( )tBbbt ∈,, . The Boolean system BS  is dead iff all transitions of BS  are dead. 
iv) Assume BS  to be safe. A marking deadµ  is named a synchronization deadlock for a Boolean 
transition BSt ∈ , if ( )deadskel µ  enables t , but no binding element ( ) ( )tBbbt ∈,, , is enabled 
at deadµ . The Boolean system BS  is free from synchronization deadlocks iff no reachable 
marking is a synchronization deadlock. 
 
Liveness of a binding element ( ) ( )tBbbt ∈,, , is a much stronger condition than high-liveness of 
the corresponding transition BSt ∈ . Theorem 3.11 will make precise the equivalence of high-
liveness and the absence of synchronization deadlocks. However, verifying that all binding 
elements of a transition are live requires more refined methods from model checking, see 
Proposition 4.8, ii). Our correctness criterion for Boolean systems is well-behavedness in the sense 
of Definition 3.6. 
3.6 Definition (Well-behavedness) 
A Boolean system BS  is well-behaved iff it is safe and live with respect to all its high bindings; 
otherwise BS  is named ill-behaved. 
 
We will see that verification of safeness is the easy part. Any discrete Petri net morphism 
21 PNPN
f
→  maps enabled occurrence sequences of 1PN  to enabled occurrence sequences 
of 2PN . The following Lemma 3.7 is a simple application of this fact. 
3.7 Lemma (Deriving saveness of a Boolean system) 
A Boolean system BS  is safe if its skeleton skelBS  is safe. 
Proof. Because the skeleton morphism 
skelBSBSskel →:  
maps enabled occurrence sequences, it maps any reachable marking of BS  to a reachable marking 
of skelBS . If no reachable marking of skelBS  marks a place with more than a single token, the 
same holds true for BS , q. e. d. 
 
The lifting problem considers the converse situation. 
3.8 Definition (Lifting property of a morphism) 
A Petri net morphism 
21 PNPN
f
→  
has the lifting property iff for any enabled occurrence sequence 2σ  of 2PN  an enabled occurrence 
sequence 1σ  of 1PN  exists with ( ) 21 σσ =f . The occurrence sequence 1σ  is named a lift of 2σ  
against f . 
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To decide if a morphism has the lifting property is not an easy task in general. For the skeleton of a 
Boolean system Lemma 3.9 solves the lifting problem. 
3.9 Lemma (Lifting property of the skeleton) 
If a safe Boolean system ( )µ,BNBS =  is free of synchronization deadlocks, then the skeleton 
morphism 
skelBSBSskel →:  
has the lifting property and skelBS  is safe too. In addition, the lift to high binding elements can be 
prescribed along an arbitrary path: Consider an enabled occurrence sequence skelσ  from skelBS  
containing a sequence 10 ... −⋅⋅ ntt  of transitions which extends to a path in BS  
( )nn ptptp ,,...,,, 1100 −=γ  with places ip , ni ≤≤0 , 
and assume that the initial place 0p  is high-marked at µ . Then skelσ  has a lift σ  to BS  
containing a sequence ( ) ( )1100 ,..., −−⋅⋅ nn btbt  of high binding elements ( )ii bt , , ni <≤0 . 
Proof. We may assume that skelσ  is a single transition skelskel BNt ∈  firing according 
to ( ) skelskelskel 1µµ σ  → . All pre-places of the corresponding transition BNt ∈  are marked. 
Because BS  is free of synchronization deadlocks, the marking µ  enables a binding ( )tBb ∈  
of BS  with ( )btskelskel ,=σ . Due to the fairness of Boolean transitions, cf. Definition 3.3, the 
binding b  can be chosen according to the demand of γ . Therefore the occurrence 
sequence ( )bt,:=σ  of BS  is a suitable lift of skelσ . 
To prove safeness of skelBS  we assume an occurrence sequence skelσ  of skelBS , which leads to a 
marking with more than one token at a given place. Lifting skelσ  to an occurrence sequence σ  
of BS  with the same property produces a contradiction to the safeness of BS , q. e. d. 
 
A Boolean system ( )µ,BNBS =  is named strongly connected if the skeleton net skelBN  is 
strongly connected. In this case skelBN  is a T-system. This fact makes precise our former 
statement that Boolean systems generalize T-systems by adding the possibility of choice and 
representing the omission of actions by a second type of tokens.  
3.10 Corollary (Skeleton of a safe and high-live Boolean system) 
A safe and high-live Boolean system BS  is strongly connected. Its skeleton skelBS  is live and 
safe. 
Proof. High-liveness implies that BS  is free of synchronization deadlocks. According to 
Lemma 3.9 the skeleton is safe and the morphism skelBSBSskel →:  has the lifting property: 
For any reachable marking skelµ  of skelB  a reachable marking µ  of skelBS  exists 
with ( ) skelskel µµ = . High-liveness of BS  implies: For any transition skelBt ∈  a binding element 
( ) ( )tBbbt ∈,, , of BN  and an occurrence sequence 1µµ σ→  exist with 1µ  enabling ( )bt, . As a 
consequence 
( ) ( ) ( )1µµµ σ skelskel skelskel  →=  
and ( )1µskel  enables t . As a consequence skelBS  is live. According to Theor. 2.25 in [De1995] 
the underlying net of a live and safe Petri net is strongly connected, q. e. d. 
 
Non-deadness of a bounded and strongly connected free-choice system implies its liveness, see 
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Theor. 4.31 in [DE1995]. We derive a similar property for Boolean systems as a consequence from 
the lifting property of the skeleton. Theorem 3.11 is a slight generalization of a result of Genrich 
and Thiagarajan who proved the statement for Boolean systems with only AND- or XOR-
transitions, see Theor. 2.12 and Lemma 3.10 in [GT1984]. 
3.11 Theorem (Liveness versus synchronization deadlock) 
For a Boolean system BS  with safe skeleton skelBS  the following properties are equivalent: 
1. BS  is high-live. 
2. BS  is strongly connected and no reachable marking of BS  is dead. 
3. BS  is free from synchronization deadlocks and the skeleton skelBS  is live. 
 
Proof. According to Lemma 3.7 the Boolean system BS  is safe. Set ( )0, µBNBS = . 
21⇒  Strong connectedness follows from Corollary 3.10, while high-liveness apparently implies 
non-deadness. 
32 ⇒  The assumption implies that at any reachable marking of BS  enables at least one binding 
element of BN . Therefore BS  has an infinite occurrence sequence σ  from 0µ . It projects 
along skelskel BSBS →  to an infinite occurrence sequence skelσ  from skel0µ . Therefore skelBS  
is live according to Theor. 3.17 in [De1995]. 
Assume the existence of a synchronization deadlock sdµ  of a transition BSt ∈ . By 
assumption sdµ  is not dead. Therefore an infinite occurrence sequence σ  from sdµ  exists. It 
projects to an infinite occurrence sequence skelσ  from ( )sdskel µ , which avoids the distinguished 
transition skelBSt ∈ . This fact is a contradiction, cf. the proof of Theor. 3.17 in [De1995]. 
13⇒  Consider a reachable marking µ  of BS  and a given transition t  of the underlying net. 
Because the initial marking of BS  contains at least one high-token, the same holds true for µ . 
Therefore a transition 1t  exists with a pre-place high-marked at µ . According to Theor. 1.14 and 
Theor. 1.15 in [GT1984] a minimal occurrence sequence ( ) skelskelskel 11 µµ σ  →  of skelBS  exists 
with skel1µ  a blocking marking associated to 1t , i.e. skel1µ  enables 1t  but no other transition 
of skelBS . By Lemma 3.9 the occurrence sequence skel1σ  lifts to 11 µµ σ→  such that 1µ  enables 
a high binding of 1t . Because 
skel
1µ  is a blocking marking, the live T -system ( )skelskelBN 1, µ  
contains an unmarked path skelβ  from ( )1tskel  to ( )tskel . A minimal occurrence sequence 
skelskel skel
21
2 µµ σ  →  
exists with skel2µ  enabling ( )tskel  and with the transitions from skelβ  contained as a subsequence 
in skel2σ . By Lemma 3.9 the occurrence sequence 
skel
2σ  has a lift 21 2 µµ σ→ , such that 2µ  
enables a high binding of t , q. e. d. 
4 Model checking of Boolean systems 
In the present chapter we combine the theory of finite complete prefixes with the propositional 
logic of Boolean transitions to derive a model checking algorithm for Boolean systems BS , see 
Algorithm 4.9. Our investigation is based on the skeleton morphism 
skelBSBSskel →:  
which has been introduced in Definition 3.1, iv). We first apply the prefix theory to skelBS . This 
task is greatly facilitated by the fact that all places of skelBS  are unbranched. As a consequence, 
all branching processes of skelBS , in particular the unfolding and finite complete prefixes, are 
processes already. 
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4.1 Definition (Colouring of a process and reachable base markings) 
Consider a Boolean system ( )0, µBNBS =  with skeleton 
( )skelskelskel BNBSBSskel 0,: µ=→  
and a finite process skelBNONpr →:  of the skeleton with 
( )( ) ( )( )ONmarkONmark maxmin = . 
i) The colouring of pr  induced by BN  is a Boolean net BON  together with a morphism 
BNBON →:cov . 
The net BON  has the skeleton ( )KEBON ,,= , Boolean transitions ( )( ) Eeeprskel ∈− ,1 , and 
Boolean places ( )( ) Bbbprskel ∈− ,1 . The morphism cov  is induced by pr . 
ii) Any marking µ  of BON  with 
( ) ( )BONsupp min=µ  and ( )( ) ( )0cov µµ skelskel =  
is named a base marking of BON . A distinguished base marking min,0µ  of BON  exists 
with ( ) 0min,0cov µµ = . 
iii) The set of reachable base markings of BON  originating from 0µ  is the smallest 
set ReachBase  of base markings of BON  with the following properties: 
• ReachBasemin0, ∈µ  
• If ReachBase∈µ  and 1µ  a base marking, which is reachable in ( )µ,BON , then 
also ReachBase∈1µ . 
For each reachable base marking ReachBase∈µ  the induced morphism of Boolean systems 
( ) ( )( )µµ cov,, BNBON →  
is named the base process starting from µ . 
 
We consider the morphism BNBON →:cov  from Definition 4.1, i) a covering, but we will 
not provide a formal definition of this concept. The morphism fits into the commutative diagram 
from Figure 5. Readers used to category theory may take it as the definition of 
BNBON →:cov , 
that the diagram from Figure 5 is a fibre product in the category of Boolean nets: 
skelpr BNON
skelskel
BNBON
→
↓↓
→cov
 
Figure 5: Finite complete prefix and its colouring 
On the basis of the morphisms from Figure 5 we explain our method of verification for a Boolean 
system ( )0,µBNBS =  with a live and safe skeleton. 
• On the level of ordinary Petri nets: We choose for the skeleton a finite complete 
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prefix skelpr BNON →  with ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )ONmarkONmarkskel maxmin0 ==µ . 
• On the level of Boolean systems: We determine BNBON →:cov  and all base 
processes ( ) ( )( )µµ cov,, BNBON → , which start from an arbitrary reachable base 
marking µ  of BON  originating from 0µ . 
• On the level of propositional logic: For each base process we employ model checking to find 
out the reachability of certain markings. 
Because the Boolean transitions from BON  and BN  correspond bijectively to each other, we will 
not distinguish between the guard formula of a transition BONt ∈  and the guard formula of the 
image transition ( ) BNt ∈cov . As a consequence, we also do not distinguish between binding 
elements of BON  and BN . 
For a finite occurrence net ON  we number its events according to the order from a topological 
sorting of the nodes of ON . The morphism skelBNONpr →:  transfers this numbering also to 
the transitions of skelBN  and a posteriori to the transitions of the Boolean nets BN  and BON . In 
the following any numbering of transitions refers to this numbering. 
 
4.2 Example (Base process) 
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Figure 6: A base process of the Boolean system from Figure 4 
Figure 6 (right hand side) repeats the Boolean system ( )µ,BNBS =  from Example 3.2, ii) and 
adds on the left hand side the Boolean system ( )min, µBON . The figure illustrates from left to right 
the covering BNBON →:cov  and the induced base process 
( ) ( )µµ ,, min BNBON →  
starting from minµ . The annotation of the nodes is similar to the annotation from Example 2.4. 
 
Prefix theory of ordinary Petri nets has been recalled in Chapter 2. Our next step in the present 
chapter investigates the structure of all reachable base markings. Here fore we introduce the 
immediate successor relation and the successor graph of reachable base markings. When 
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considering a Boolean system ( )0,µBNBS =  with a safe skeleton skelBS  we will always assume 
in the following, that a covering BNBON →:cov  has been selected on the basis of a 
distinguished finite complete prefix skelBNONpr →:  of skelBS  with 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )ONmarkONmarkskel maxmin0 ==µ . 
4.3 Definition (The successor graph of reachable base markings) 
Consider a safe Boolean system ( )0, µBNBS =  and a distinguished covering 
BNBON →:cov . On the set of all reachable base markings of BON  we define the following 
partial order: ReachBase∈2µ  is an immediate successor of ReachBase∈1µ , iff 2µ  is reachable 
in ( )1, µBON . The successor graph sucΓ  of reachable base markings of BON  is the following 
directed graph: Vertices of sucΓ  are the reachable base markings of BON  originating from 0µ , an 
oriented arc from 1µ  to 2µ  exists in sucΓ  iff 2µ  is an immediate successor of 1µ . 
 
The graph sucΓ  is connected. The reason is: Each reachable base marking µ  can be reached 
from min,0µ  along a finite path - by construction. In general sucΓ  is not strongly connected. We 
denote by sucCΓ  the induced graph of strong components of sucΓ . For each vertex sucx Γ∈  the 
class [ ] sucCx Γ∈  denotes the strong component of x  as a set of vertices from sucΓ . By 
construction the directed graph sucCΓ  is acyclic. Its oriented arcs define a partial order on the 
vertices of sucCΓ . The order has the unique minimal element [ ]{ }0min µ=Γ sucC  and a finite set 
{ }nsuc cpcpC ,...,max 1=Γ  
of maximal elements. Elements of sucCΓmin  and sucCΓmax  are named respectively minimal 
and maximal strong components of sucΓ . 
For the Boolean system ( )µ,BNBS =  from our running Example 3.2 the coloured net BON  from 
Example 4.2 has two reachable base markings 
µµ =:1  with ( ) ( )211 AAMark ¬∧=µ  and 2µ  with ( ) ( ) 212 AAMark ∧¬=µ . 
We have 21 µµ ≤  and 12 µµ ≤ . Therefore, the successor graph sucΓ  has only two vertices and is 
strongly connected. Its unique strong component { }21, µµ=cp  is both minimal and maximal. 
 
The concept of the successor graph of reachable base markings permits us to split arbitrary 
occurrence sequences of a safe Boolean system BS  into occurrence sequences of fixed length. 
Their length depends only on the choice of a finite complete prefix of an unfolding of skelBS . 
Each of these fragmented occurrence sequences of bounded length can be studied with one of the 
base processes.  
4.4 Remark (Permutation of occurrence sequences) 
We recall that an enabled transition of a T-system loses its firing concession only by firing itself. 
This fact applies to the skeleton of a Boolean system BS  and generalizes to binding elements 
of BS : Consider a fixed Boolean transition BSt ∈ . An enabled binding element ( ) ( )tBbt ∈,  loses 
its concession only by firing itself or by the firing of another enabled binding element of the same 
transition t . As a consequence, Lemma 3.24 in [DE1995] about the permutation of occurrence 
sequences in T-systems applies mutatis mutandis also to occurrence sequences of BS . 
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4.5 Lemma (Characterization of reachability) 
Consider a safe Boolean system ( )0, µBNBS =  and a distinguished covering 
BNBON →:cov . For any marking µ  of BN  we have the equivalence: 
i) The marking µ  is reachable in BS . 
ii) A reachable base marking bµ  of BON  originating from 0µ  and a reachable marking µ~  
of ( )bBON µ,  with ( ) µµ =~cov  exist. 
Proof. Because of ( ) ( )ONmarkONmark maxmin =  the sum of all transitions skelBNt ∈  which 
occur due to the events from ON  is a T-invariant τ . Here the transitions are taken with the 
multiplicity of their occurrence. All transitions from skelBN  are contained in τ  with the same 
multiplicity ∗∈ Nk , i.e.  
∑
∈
⋅=
skelBNt
tkτ . 
ii) => i) Because bµ  is a reachable base marking, a sequence niib ,...,0,, =µ , of reachable base 
markings exists with 
min,00, µµ =b , 1, +ibµ  is an immediate successor of ib,µ  for 1,...,0 −= ni , bnb µµ =, . 
The corresponding base processes ( ) ( )( )ibib BNBON ,, cov,, µµ →  induce in BN  occurrence 
sequences 
( ) ( )nbb ,1,0 cov...cov µµµ →→→ . 
And the assumed reachability of µ~  in ( )bBON µ,  provides an occurrence sequence 
( ) ( ) µµµ =→ ~covcov b . 
The catenation of all occurrence sequences from above is an occurrence sequence of BS  which 
leads to µ . 
i) => ii) Because ON  is a complete prefix, a cut c  of ON  exists with ( ) ( )µskelcmark = . Due to 
Remark 4.4 we may permute occurrence sequences from BS  which lead to µ . Multiple 
application of Lemma 3.24 in [DE1995] and consideration of the special form of τ  provide 
• a series 1,...,0,1 −=→ + niii i µµ
σ
, of occurrence sequences of BN  such that 
each iσ  1,...,0, −= ni , fires exactly k  binding elements of each transition BNt ∈  
• and an occurrence sequence µµ σ→ nn  firing no more than k  binding elements of each 
transition BNt ∈  and less than k  binding elements for at least one transition from BN . 
As a consequence we obtain reachable base markings nii ,...,0,min, =µ , with each min,1+iµ  an 
immediate successor of min,iµ . With min,: nb µµ =  we obtain µ~  a as reachable marking 
of ( )bBON µ, , q. e. d. 
 
Preparing our model checking algorithm we now attach to BNBON →:cov  a series of 
formulas from propositional logic, which represent certain behavioural properties of the system, 
see Table 2 and Definition 4.6. The satisfiability of these formulas is equivalent to the presence or 
absence of these properties. The column “Property” in Table 2 looks ahead to Proposition 4.8. 
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Name Definition Context Property 
Marking 
formula 
( )
sr YYXX
Mark
¬∧∧¬∧∧∧
=
......
:
11
µ
 
arbitrary 
BN  
 
                - 
Reachability 
formula 
( )
( ) iGGMark
Reach
∧∧∧
=
...
:
0
1
µ
µ
 
( )µ,BON
 
1µ  reachable iff  
( )1µReach  satisfiable 
Enabling 
formula 
( ) ( )( )btReachbtEnabl enabl ,:, µ=  ( )µ,BON  ( )bt,  non dead iff 
( )btEnabl ,  satisfiable 
Deadlock 
formula 
( )
( ) ( )ndeaddead ReachReach
teadD
,1, ...
:
µµ ∨∨
=
 
( )µ,BON  
with safe 
BS  
synchronization deadlock 
of t  reachable iff 
( )tDead  satisfiable 
Table 2: Formulas representing the semantics of a Boolean system 
 
4.6 Definition (Formulas representing the semantics of a Boolean system) 
i) Consider a Boolean net BN  with arc annotation ( )BOOLEVarFX →:  and Boolean 
transitions ( )Gt, . For a marking µ , with marks each place of BN  with at most one token, we 
define its marking formula as 
( ) sr YYXXMark ¬∧∧¬∧∧∧= ......: 11µ  
with { } ( ) ( ){ }truepBNtBNptpXXX r =∈∈= µ,,:,,...,1  
and { } ( ) ( ){ }falsepBNtBNptpXYY s =∈∈= µ,,:,,...,1  
the set of variables annotating the arcs starting or ending at marked places. 
ii) Consider a safe Boolean system ( )0, µBNBS = , a distinguished covering BNBON →:cov  
and a reachable base marking µ  of BON  originating from 0µ . 
• For a marking 1µ  of BON  we define its reachability formula with respect to ( )µ,BON  as 
( ) ( ) iGGMarkReach ∧∧∧= ...: 01 µµ  
with i  the minimal index such that firing the occurrence sequence itt ...0=σ  of the 
skeleton skelBS  creates the marking ( )( )1cov µskel . 
• For a binding element ( ) ( )tBbbt ∈,, , of a Boolean transition t  of BN  we define its enabling 
formula with respect to ( )µ,BON  as 
( ) ( )( )btReachbtEnabl enabl ,:, µ=  
with ( )btenabl ,µ  the enabling marking of ( )bt,  considered as a binding element of BON . 
• For a Boolean transition t  of BN  we define its deadlock formula with respect to ( )µ,BON  
as 
( ) ( ) ( )ndeaddead ReachReachteadD ,1, ...: µµ ∨∨=  
with ndeaddead ,..., ,1, µµ  the synchronization deadlocks of t  considered as a transition 
of BON . 
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4.7 Remark (Reachability and satisfiability) 
With the notations of Definition 4.6: According to Lemma 4.5 the reachability of ( )1cov µ  in the 
original Boolean system BS  is equivalent to the reachability of 1µ  in ( )preBON µ, . And 1µ  is 
reachable in ( )preBON µ,  iff its reachability formula ( )1µReach  with respect to ( )preBON µ,  is 
satisfiable. 
 
Apparently, binary opening transitions do not have any synchronization deadlocks. As a 
consequence their deadlock formula is the constant false . Table 3 shows the deadlock formulas of 
binary closing Boolean transitions of different logical type. Their arc annotations refer to Figure 3. 
The column “Distinguished enabling formula(s)” will be referred to when explaining 
Algorithm 4.9. 
 
Logical type Deadlock formula Distinguished enabling formula(s) 
AND ( ) ( )YXReachYXReach ∧¬∨¬∧  - 
XOR ( )YXReach ∧  - 
AND_XOR ( )YXReach ∧¬  ( )YXReach ¬∧  
XOR_AND ( )YXReach ¬∧  ( )YXReach ∧¬  
OR false  ( )YXReach ∧ , ( )YXReach ¬∧ , 
( )YXReach ∧¬  
Table 3: Deadlock formulas and distinguished enabling formulas of binary closing Boolean transitions 
 
4.8 Proposition (Model checking of a safe Boolean system) 
Consider a safe Boolean system ( )0, µBNBS =  and a distinguished covering 
BNBON →:cov . 
i) BS  is free from synchronization deadlocks iff for all Boolean transitions BNt ∈  and each 
reachable base marking µ  of BON  the formula ( )tDead  with respect to ( )µ,BON  is not 
satisfiable. 
ii) If BS  is free from synchronization deadlocks, then BS  is live with respect to all its high-
bindings iff for each transition BSt ∈  and each high binding element ( ) ( )tBbbt ∈,,  the following 
holds true: Each maximal strong component sucCcp Γ∈  of the successor graph sucΓ  of BS  
contains a reachable base marking cp∈µ , such that the formula ( )btEnabl ,  with respect 
to ( )µ,BON  is satisfiable. 
Proof. ad i) Because ( )tDead  is a disjunction of reachability formulas, it is satisfiable iff at least 
one of these reachability formulas is satisfiable. A reachability formula like 
( ) ( ) idead GGMarkReach ∧∧∧= ...: 0µµ  
with respect to ( )µ,BON  is satisfiable iff deadµ  is reachable in ( )µ,BON . Therefore the 
statement follows from Remark 4.7. 
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ad ii) We assume that the binding ( )bt,  is live. We consider an arbitrary strong 
component sucCcp Γ∈ max  and an arbitrary reachable base marking cpb ∈µ . By assumption a 
reachable marking 1µ  of ( )( )bb BNBS µcov,:=  exists which enables ( )bt, . Applying Lemma 4.5 
to the Boolean system bBS  we obtain a reachable base marking µ  of BON  originating 
from ( )bµcov  and a reachable marking 1~µ  of ( )µ,BON  with ( ) 11~cov µµ = . Note that µ  is also a 
reachable base marking originating from 0µ . Due to the maximality of the strong component cp  
each reachable base marking originating from ( )bµcov  belongs to cp . Therefore cp∈µ . The 
statement now follows from Remark 4.7. 
For the opposite direction we have to prove that the binding element ( )bt,  is live. We start with a 
reachable marking preµ  of BS  and have to find a reachable marking postµ  of ( )preBN µ,  which 
enables ( )bt, . According to Lemma 4.5 a reachable base marking µ  of BON  and a reachable 
marking preµ~  of ( )µ,BON  with ( ) prepre µµ =~cov  exist. Like BS  also ( )µ,BON  is free from 
synchronization deadlocks. According to Lemma 3.9 at least one immediate successor 1µ  of µ  is 
reachable in ( )preBON µ~, . In sucCΓ  a path exists from [ ]1µ  to a maximal element sucCcp Γ∈ max . 
By assumption a base marking cp∈2µ  and a reachable marking 3µ  of ( )2, µBON  exist such 
that 2µ  enables ( )bt,  when considered a binding element of BON . The 
marking ( )2cov: µµ =post  is reachable in ( )preBN µ,  by construction and enables ( )bt,  when the 
latter is considered a binding element of BN , q. e. d. 
 
The main result of the paper is the following Algorithm 4.9 for the verification of a Boolean 
system with a live and safe skeleton. 
4.9 Algorithm (Liveness of a safe Boolean system) 
Input: Binary Boolean system ( )0, µBNBS =  with a live and safe skeleton skelBS . 
Output:  
• List of Boolean transitions of BS  which suffer a synchronizing deadlock. 
• List of transitions of BS  which are not live with respect to all their high bindings. 
 
Determine a finite complete prefix skelpr BNON →  of the unfolding of skelBS  with 
( ) ( )ONprONpr minmax =  
Set BNBON →:cov  the colouring of skelBNONpr →:  
Determine the successor graph sucΓ  of reachable base markings originating from 0µ  
Is ( )µ,BON  deadlock free for each reachable base marking sucΓ∈µ ? 
No Yes 
 
- 
Determine the set sucCΓmax  of maximal strong components of sucΓ  
For each sucCcp Γ∈ max  and each high binding ( )bt,  of BN  check, whether for at least 
one cp∈µ  the binding element ( )bt,  can be enabled in ( )µ,BON  
Output result 
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We will now discuss in detail the different steps of algorithm 4.9. 
i) The T-system ( )skelskelskel BNBS 0, µ=  is live and safe iff every circuit of skelBN  is marked 
at skel0µ  and every place of skelBN  is contained in a circuit marked at skel0µ  with exactly one 
token, see Theor. 3.15 and 3.18 in [DE1995]. 
ii) For all examples in the present paper the algorithm from [ERV2002] constructs a finite 
complete prefix skelBNON →  with 
( ) ( )ONprONpr minmax = . 
However, this equality does not hold for any minimal finite complete prefix.  
 
p_2
t_3
p_4
t_2
p_0
p_3
t_1
p_3
t_3
p_2p_1
t_0
p_0
p_4
t_1
t_2
p_2
p_1
t_0
p_0
e_7
e_6
e_5
e_4e_3
e_2
e_1
e_0
t_3
t_1
t_2
c_11
c_10
c_9
c_8
c_7c_6
c_5 c_4
c_3
c_2
c_0 c_1
p_1
p_0
token
p_2
token
p_3 t_0
p_4
 
Figure 7: Finite complete prefixes of a live and safe T-system (right) 
Figure 7 shows a finite complete prefix NONpr →22 :  of the unfolding of a live and safe 
T-system ( )0, µN . The part of Figure 7 above the dotted line shows the restriction 
NONpr →11 :  
with 21 ONON ⊂  the subnet generated by the nodes { }4070 ,...,,,..., eecc . It is a finite complete 
prefix too. Its final cut { } 1761 ,max ONccON ⊂=  satisfies 
( ) { } ( ) { }201211 ,min,max ppONprppONpr =≠=  
and does not restore the original marking, i.e., ( ) 01max µ≠ONmark . 
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Because a live and bounded T-system is cyclic, each finite process 1pr  of ( )skelskelskel BNBS 0, µ=  
extends to a finite process 2pr , 21 prpr ⊆ , which restores the original marking 
skel
0µ . We may 
assume that 2pr  can be obtained from 1pr  without firing all transitions of 
skelBN , see 
Lemma 3.24 in [DE1995]. As a consequence: If skelBNt ∈0  is a transition with maximal 
occurrence 
( ) ( ){ }skelBNttprtprn ∈== −− :max: 11011  
then 
( )tprn 12−=  for all skelBNt ∈ . 
In the example from Figure 7 we have 2=n . 
iii) To obtain the colouring BNBON →:cov  of the process skelBNONpr →:  one has to 
annotate each place of the occurrence net ON  with the set Boole , each arc with the same variable 
as the corresponding arc in BN  and each transition of ON  with the same guard function as the 
corresponding transition in BN , see Definition 4.1, i). 
iv) For the computation of the successor graph sucΓ  of reachable base markings Algorithm 4.9 
first computes the set MB  of base markings of BON . The markings from MB  correspond to the 
different combinations of high and low tokens on the places of ( )BONinm . 
In the next step the algorithm determines which of the base markings from MB  are reachable base 
markings. Most simple is the case of a singleton ( ) { }cBONinm = . It corresponds to the case that 
only one place ( )cp cov=  of BN  is marked at the initial marking 0µ : By Definition 3.1 the 
token content of p  is a high-token and due to the fairness condition in Definition 3.3 the other 
marking from MB  is not reachable because it does not comprise any high token. Therefore the 
marking min,0µ  is the only reachable base marking. 
In general Algorithm 4.9 employs model checking to determine which of the markings MB∈µ  
are reachable. The construction of sucΓ  may proceed with the iterative construction of a spanning 
tree ΓΤ . Starting with { }min,0µ=ΓΤ  one checks for each marking { }0µµ −∈ MB  the 
reachability of µ  in ( )min,0, µBON . If µ  is reachable, then it is added to ΓΤ  and removed 
from MB . Iteratively the subsequent steps check the reachability of the remaining elements 
from MB  with respect to the already existing vertices from ΓΤ . As noted subsequent to 
Definition 4.6, a marking µ  is reachable in ( )1, µBON  iff the formula ( )µReach  with respect 
to ( )1, µBON  is satisfiable. 
v) Only for closing Boolean transitions of logical type AND, XOR, AND_XOR and XOR_AND 
(see Table 3) Algorithm 4.9 has to investigate possible synchronization deadlocks. The check is 
performed as satisfiability check according to Proposition 4.8, i). 
vi) After verifying that the Boolean system BS  is free of synchronization deadlocks we can apply 
the lifting Lemma 3.9. As a consequence, from each reachable marking of BS  a marking is 
reachable, which marks the pre-place of a given opening transition of BS  with a high token. The 
marking therefore enables all high-bindings elements of the transition. 
Similarly, each high binding element of a closing transition of logical type AND or XOR is live: 
Always a marking is reachable, which marks a given pre-place of the transition with a high-token, 
the other pre-place with a second token and such that the transition is not in a synchronization 
deadlock. 
Only for closing transitions of logical type AND_XOR, XOR_AND and OR a separate 
investigation is needed. Table 3 shows those enabling formulas ( )btEnabl ,  which Algorithm 4.9 
has to check according to Proposition 4.8, ii). 
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5 Application to EPCs 
One of the first questions, which comes up when checking a given EPC for correctness, is: 
• Which are the boundary events of the EPC? 
An EPC must be either without any boundary nodes or it must be bounded by events, having at 
least one in-event and one out-event. That’s a syntactic property which can be easily checked. In-
events are initial or triggering events. But in case of loops also inner initial events may exist. 
Similarly are out-events the terminal or goal events of the process. And in case of loops also inner 
terminal events may exist. The situation becomes more difficult when the EPC has more than one 
single in-event or more than one single out-event. In that case the second question is: 
• Which combinations of in-events and which combinations of out-events are intended by the 
modeller of the EPC? 
This question can no longer be answered by a syntactical analysis. In general it cannot even be 
answered by a semantical analysis. Instead the answer must be known before any semantical 
analysis can start. Sometimes the boundary events of the EPC are annotated by process indicators 
referring to processes at the next higher level of a hierarchical process model. Then the possible 
combinations of the boundary events derive top-down from the possible event combinations within 
the process model one level higher. But often such a model is lacking. To clarify the intention of 
the modeller in this case, one can use an algorithm to generate a proposal for the possible event 
combinations. The algorithm applies mirror reflexion to both the first logical connectors after the 
in-events and the last logical connectors before the out-events. However, if the modeller is not a 
hand and his intention cannot be read off from the name of the events, the model checker himself 
has to make an educated guess. 
After these two questions have been answered, the verification of the EPC continues with adding a 
start/end-connection: We introduce a separate event „start/end“ and connect this distinguished 
event by arcs and logical connectors to all intended combinations of start events. Similar we 
connect all intended combinations of end-events by logical connectors and arcs with the 
distinguished event. After this kind of short-circuiting the resulting EPC should be strongly 
connected. Otherwise the structure of the EPC is considered to be faulty. All following steps of the 
verification will presuppose a short-circuited, strongly connected EPC. 
Most easy is the verification of AND/XOR EPCs. These are EPCs with logical connectors of type 
AND or XOR only. To define the semantics of AND/XOR-EPCs and for their verification no 
Boolean systems are necessary. Instead the EPC translates to a free-choice system: Events 
translate to places, functions to transitions, while logical connectors of type AND translate to 
transitions and logical connector of type XOR translate to places. Possibly some additional 
unbranched places or transitions have to be introduced for syntactical reasons. Each place which 
represents a start event gets marked with a token. The resulting ordinary Petri net is a free-choice 
system. It defines the free-choice semantics of the EPC [Aal1999]. Algorithms to verify liveness 
and safeness of free-choice systems resulting from AND/XOR EPCs are well-established, see 
Theor. 4.2 in [ES1990] or Theor. 5.8 in [DE1995]. 
Of course the free-choice semantics of an AND/XOR-EPC can also be obtained from its Boolean 
semantics, which results from translating the EPC into a Boolean system: Events translate to 
Boolean places, functions into unary Boolean transitions, while logical connectors of type AND 
and XOR translate to Boolean transitions of the corresponding logical type. Each in-event 
produces a high token on the corresponding place. In addition low tokens have to be added such 
that the skeleton is live and safe. If the resulting Boolean system BS  is restricted to the flow of 
high tokens then the free-choice system highBS , which defines the free-choice semantics, is 
obtained, see [SW2010]. 
Now we address general EPCs with logical connectors of arbitrary type. The type may differ from 
AND or XOR. 
5.1 Example (Closing OR-connector) 
The example from Figure 8 shows an EPC with a closing OR-connector. 
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Start
End
OR
XOR
 Function 1
AND
XOR
XOR
AND
XOR
XOR
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4
Function 4 Function 5
Function 2
Event 5
Function 3
Event 6
Event 7 Event 8
Function 6
 
Figure 8: EPC with closing OR-connector 
The process is triggered by the event Start. Depending on the outcome of Function 1 exactly one 
of the events Event 1,…, Event 4 happens. Event 1 triggers both, Function 2 and Function 5, while 
Event 2 triggers only Function 5. Analogously Event 4 triggers Function 3 and Function 4, while 
Event 3 triggers only Function 4. Finally the outcome of any combination of Function  4 and 
Function 5 triggers Function 6 and the final event End. The process comprises a set of functions 
and events, which are activated according to a non-trivial control flow. Its logic is determined by a 
series of connectors of logical type AND, XOR and OR. 
The modeller has provided the EPC with a single in-event and a single out-event. Therefore it is 
straightforward for the model checker to short-circuit the EPC. 
Due to the OR-join the EPC from Figure 8 does not translate to a free-choice system as long as the 
difference between XOR and OR is respected. However, after translating the OR-connector to a 
Boolean transition of logical type OR the Boolean semantics of this EPC is well-defined. In 
addition Algorithm 4.9 verifies that the resulting Boolean system is well-behaved. 
 
We are now returning to our running example „Loan request“ from Figure 1. We collect all steps 
for its verification that we have developed in this paper.  
5.2 Example (Loan request) 
The EPC „Loan request“ from Figure 1 has a logical connector of type different from AND or 
XOR. The verification of the EPC proceeds along the following steps: 
• Translation of the EPC into a strongly-connected Boolean system ( )µ,BNBS = , see Figure 4. 
• Verifying that the skeleton skelBS is safe and live. 
• Applying Algorithm 4.9: 
o Determination of a finite complete prefix skelBNONpr →: , see Figure 2. 
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o Determination of the colouring BNBON →:cov  of pr , compare Figure 6. 
o Determination of the successor graph sucΓ , see remark after Definition 4.3. 
o Applying Proposition 4.8 to the base processes ( ) ( ) )cov,(, bb BNBON µµ → . 
Algorithm 4.9 outputs that the Boolean system from Figure 4 is ill-behaved: 
 
 
Table 4: Model checking: EPC NOK 
The Boolean system is deadlock free, but its closing Boolean transition 4t  of logical type OR is 
not live with respect to all its high-bindings. After changing its logical type to AND_XOR the 
Boolean system becomes well-behaved, see Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5: Model checking: EPC OK 
Note. In Table 4 and Table 5 the meaning of the German words is “nicht = not”, “und = and”.  
 
function
event event
function function
function
event event
function function
event event
function function
function
event event
function function
event event
function function
AND_XOR
AND_XOR
event event
function function
 
Figure 9: Different modelling constructs for the EPC “Loan request” 
The authors of [MA2008] have employed a subtle logical construct to provide the EPC with an 
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opening AND_XOR-connector. They used a combination of two XOR- and one opening AND-
connector, Figure 9 (left hand side). To close the alternative the authors did not use the formally 
analogous construction with two XOR- and one closing AND-connector, Figure 9 (middle). The 
closing construction would have been erroneous, because it does not synchronize the decisions 
made at the indicated two XOR-splits in Figure 9 (middle). Instead the authors use one OR-join to 
close the AND_XOR alternative Figure 9 (left hand side).  But one of the three firing modes of the 
closing OR will never be activated. 
Different from the authors of [MA2008] we therefore consider the EPC from Figure 4 ill-behaved. 
In accordance with the above model checking result we propose to model the EPC with a pair of 
AND_XOR-alternatives like in Figure 9 (right hand side). 
 
As a final example we consider an EPC from [DVV2006] proposed by the authors as a 
visualization of their method of EPC verification. 
5.3 Example (EPC describing the EPC verification process) 
The EPC from Figure 10 illustrates the verification procedure from [DVV2006] and reproduces 
Fig. 2 from [DVV2006]. The EPC exemplifies the difficulty for the model checker to short-circuit 
a given EPC. What are the intended initial events, which are the intended final events of the EPC 
from Figure 10? 
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Figure 10: EPC describing the EPC verification process, see [DVV2006] 
The EPC has three in-events “EPC ready to be verified” (S1), “Possible combinations of initial 
Events” (S2) and “Allowed final Markings” (S3) as well as five out-events “EPC is correct and 
executable” (E1), “EPC can be correct. Further investigation necessary” (E2), “EPC is incorrect, 
Problem has to be solved” (E3), “Initial Events are known” (E4) and “Possible final Markings 
known” (E5). From their annotation the reader cannot read off all intended combinations. But the 
translation of the EPC to a Petri net in [DVV2006], Fig. 3, achieved by the modellers themselves 
shows, that surprisingly some of these events are not intended as boundary events at all. The pair 
of events E4 and S2 as well as E5 and S3 seem to be annotations intended as hints for the human 
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reader. The two components of each pair should therefore better be linked by two functions “t” 
and “u”: Therefore we assume that the EPC intended by the modeller looks like Figure 11. It has a 
single in-event (S1) and an XOR-combination of the three out-events E1, E2 and E3. 
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Figure 11: Intended EPC describing the EPC verification process 
The OR-connector named 1OR  in Figure 11 decomposes into two binary OR-connectors as shown 
in Figure 12. 
 
OR_1 OR_11 OR_12
 
Figure 12: Decomposition of the OR-connector 1OR  from Figure 11 
When the authors from [DVV2006] translate the EPC to a resembling Petri net, they transform the 
OR-join 11OR  in Figure 12 to a closing transition and the OR-join 12OR  to a closing place. And 
they transform the XOR-join 1XOR  from Figure 11 to a closing place too. The authors do not give 
any justification for these transformations. In particular they do not explain why they skip the 
difference between the OR-join and the XOR-join. 
Figure 13 shows the binary Boolean system which results from short-circuiting and translating the 
EPC from Figure 11. Some unary transitions have been skipped in order to focus on the control 
flow. 
The final events E1, E2 and E3 of Figure 11 translate to the places A_19, A_20 and A_21 of 
Figure 13. The initial event S1 translates to the marked place at the beginning of arc A_0. The two 
OR-joins 11OR  and 12OR  from Figure 12 translate respectively to the Boolean transitions 6t  
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and 7t  of logical type OR, while the XOR-join 1XOR  from Figure 11 translates to the Boolean 
transition 10t  of logical type XOR. 
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Figure 13: Binary Boolean system of the EPC from Figure 11 
Algorithm 4.9 outputs that the Boolean system from Figure 13 is ill-behaved, see Table 6: The 
Boolean system is deadlock-free but the closing Boolean transitions 6t  and 7t  of logical type OR 
are not high-live with respect to all their bindings. 
 
 
Table 6: Model checking: EPC NOK 
After changing the logical type of transition 6t  into AND and of transition 7t  into XOR the 
resulting Boolean system BS  gets well-behaved, see Table 7. The Boolean system BS  has 
Boolean transitions of logical type AND and XOR only. Accordingly it can be replaced by its high 
system highBS , which is the ordinary Petri net from Fig. 3 in [DVV2006] after short-circuiting. 
 
 
Table 7: Model checking: EPC OK 
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6 Conclusion and Outlook 
We start comparing our proposal for the model checking of Boolean process models with the 
results of the related papers named in the introduction from section 1, see Table 8.  
 
No. Reference Process 
model 
language 
Reference 
language 
Checked 
properties 
Method of 
verification 
Tool 
1.  [DVV2006] EPC ordinary safe 
Petri net 
soundness, 
relaxed soundness 
reduction ProM 
2.  [MA2008] EPC EPC EPC soundness reduction, state 
space exploration 
xoEPC 
3.  [FFJ2009] UML/ 
BPMN 
ordinary Petri 
net 
safeness, liveness model checking with 
CTL 
LoLA 
4.  [FFJ2009] UML/ 
BPMN 
workflow net soundness reduction, state 
space exploration 
Woflan 
5.  [FFJ2009] UML/ 
BPMN 
workflow 
graph 
soundness SESE fragmentation IBM WebSphere 
Business Modeler 
6.  Present 
paper 
EPC Boolean 
system 
safeness, liveness model checking with 
propositional logic 
under construction 
Table 8: Selected methods for the verification of Boolean process models 
In our opinion the main differences between the methods from No. 1 to 5 compared to method 6 
are the following:  
• Method 6 considers a Boolean process model as a high-level construct and uses the high-level 
language of Boolean systems from the class of Coloured Petri nets. The other methods, which 
also use Petri nets as a reference language, always employ ordinary Petri nets.  
We think that the branching of the control flow as logical AND-, XOR-, OR-, AND_XOR- 
and other types of splits and joins cannot be adequately modelled by low-level constructs. 
Apparently each high-level Petri net can be flattened into an ordinary Petri net. But during this 
step much information gets lost which better should be kept together.  
• Different from method 3, which is the only other model checking method from Table 8, 
method 6 uses model checking on high-level Petri nets. In our opinion high-level systems 
should be checked with high-level methods - as long as it is possible. For Boolean systems 
even the elementary means of propositional logic are sufficient.  
• In our approach from [LSW1998] the semantics of an EPC is defined as the semantics of the 
corresponding Boolean system. Due to the concept of low-tokens the semantics is the usual 
Petri net semantics which is well-defined for each type of logical constructor.  
To the best of our knowledge we do not know other correct semantics of EPC constructs like 
the OR-join or the AND_XOR-join. We are well aware of different proposals in the literature, 
but often the proposed semantics is a global semantics and therefore seems at risk of the 
“vicious circle“ [Kin2006].  
• Tool support for method 6 is under construction. At present we are working on an interface 
between the tools CPN and Eclipse, in order to export Boolean system from CPN to Eclipse, 
the run-time environment of our implementation of Algorithm 4.9. We plan to link also a fully 
developed SAT-solver.  
The theory of branching processes has been generalized from its original target of ordinary Petri 
nets to branching processes of high-level Petri nets [KK2003]. Different from this approach, which 
is based on low-level occurrence nets, our concept of a base process from Definition 4.1 studies a 
given high-level system by means of another high-level net, which is the colouring of a low-level 
occurrence net. 
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The purpose of our paper was to recall Boolean systems as a reference language for Boolean 
process models. The question, which of the advanced workflow patterns from [RHA2006] 
translate to the language of Boolean systems, has not been touched upon in the present paper: 
That’s a challenge for further investigation. 
Boolean systems are capable of providing a local semantics for the branching of the control flow 
according to arbitrary logical rules. Our method of verification applies to any strongly connected 
Boolean system. No further restrictions exist, neither with respect to the topology of the net nor 
concerning the initial marking, i.e., strongly connected Boolean systems with an arbitrary number 
of loops and initial tokens are admissible for model checking.  
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